rides in an unknown city, where the driver is better informed about the shortest route to the destination than the tourist; or medical treatments, where the doctor knows better which disease a patient has and which treatment is needed.
From the viewpoint of standard economic theory (relying on the assumption that all agents are rational, risk-neutral and exclusively interested in their own material payoffs) efficiency in markets for credence goods is expected to be low for the following reasons: If not restricted by institutional safeguards, such as liability clauses or ex post verifiability of actions, experts will always provide a low quality service, even when consumers need a higher quality; and experts will ask for a higher price than warranted by the provided service. The former type of fraud is known as undertreatment and the latter type as overcharging. When consumers can judge the quality of service they get (without knowing whether the quality received is the ex ante needed one, though), experts may also provide an unnecessarily high quality, which is referred to as overtreatment (see Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006 , for a survey of the theoretical literature).
Despite the monetary incentives for experts to defraud consumers, the turnover in markets for credence goods is huge. For instance, the online site researchandmarkets.com reports that the U.S. auto repair industry comprises about 170,000 firms with combined annual revenues of $90 billion, of which 70% originates from mechanical repair. Likewise, health care expenditures account for approximately 15% of GDP in the U.S. and are still rising (WHO World Health Statistics 2009) .
In this paper, we examine in an experiment the influence of belief-shaping devices on the efficient provision of credence goods. While institutional safeguards against fraud (like liability) and market forces (like competition and the possibility to build up a reputation) have been shown recently to increase efficiency on credence goods markets, the impact of "soft" factors such as non-binding promises has been ignored so far as possibly important for limiting undertreatment, overtreatment, and overcharging, and thus contributing to the efficient provision of credence goods. 1 Soft factors such as non-binding promises have no effect on market behavior if all players are rational and only interested in their own material payoff, and if this fact is common knowledge among players. However, if agents have belief-dependent preferences, soft factors might become behaviorally relevant. that quality. This design feature allows investigating the endogenous selection among promises that differ in more than one dimension, and their effectiveness on trade in credence goods markets.
Device 2: Giving the consumer an opportunity to burn money. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, Proposition 12) have shown that the presence of a money-burning option might be quite powerful when agents have belief-dependent motivations. Their story is based on a psychological forward-induction argument and the idea that chosen and unchosen alternatives reveal first-order beliefs of the decision maker and thereby shape second-order beliefs of an observer. Since in psychological guilt aversion theory second-order beliefs influence behavior, unchosen alternatives of one person might have an effect on the behavior of another person. Here is a sketch of the argument (see Section 3 and Appendix A for details): Suppose the consumer of a credence good has the opportunity to burn money before interacting with the expert and the amount burned is communicated to the expert. Furthermore, suppose that the moderately guilt-averse expert knows that for a rational consumer burning money is only a best reply if he has at least somewhat optimistic beliefs about the behavior of the expert. Then, the observation that the consumer has burned money allows the expert to draw the inference that the consumer has at least somewhat optimistic beliefs and this inference might induce him to behave in a consumer-friendly manner. Moreover, by not burning money the consumer (anticipating consumer-friendly behavior in response to burning money) conveys the belief that he expects to get even more. Thus, in the presence of a money-burning option simply trading with the expert (without burning money) allows the expert to draw more exact inferences about the consumer's optimistic expectations than the same action allows in the absence of the money-burning option and might thereby induce even a moderately guilt-averse expert to behave in a consumer-friendly manner (while in the absence of this option only very guilt-averse experts would behave that way). Psychological forward-induction arguments are theoretically elegant (they rely only on the assumption of common belief in rationality without evoking equilibrium thinking) and quite powerful (in many games evoking equilibrium yields multiplicity while applying psychological forward induction yields uniquenessgame Γ 2 in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009 , is an example).
Our results from an experiment with 208 participants confirm the behavioral relevance of promises: most experts make the predicted promise and proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior. However, we also obtain some data that is clearly inconsistent with the current version of the theory of 'simple guilt': A non-negligible fraction of experts make promises that should not be observed according to this theory and this fraction is increasing over time. We discuss this point further in the discussion and conclusion section. Turning to the effect of the money-burning option our results fail to confirm its behavioral relevance, thus confirming earlier studies. We conclude that promises are behaviorally relevant but that their impact cannot be explained by psychological guilt aversion theory alone, and that money burning is less powerful in practice than in theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces three versions of our credence goods game, a baseline game, an extended game where the expert has an option to make a promise to the consumer before the consumer decides whether to interact with the expert, and a different extension in which the consumer has an option to burn money before interacting with the expert. The section ends with predictions for the three games for the case where it is common knowledge that all agents are rational and exclusively interested in their own material payoffs. Section 3 introduces belief-based guilt aversion and studies its impact on behavior in the three games. Section 4 explains the experimental design and derives predictions for our three treatments which correspond to the three games introduced in Section 2. Section 5 reports the experimental results, and Section 6 discusses alternative explanations and concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Material games

Baseline game, Γ B
We take a simplified version of Dulleck and Kerschbamer's (2006) model of credence goods as our starting point. In this game, there are two players, an expert (he) and a consumer (she). The consumer has a problem θ that is with an ex ante probability q l minor (θ = l) and with probability 1 − q l major (θ = h). If the consumer decides to visit the expert, the expert finds out the severity of the problem by performing a diagnosis. He then provides a service that is either of high (h) or of low (l) quality. In the following, we denote the index of the quality provided (the expert's "provision decision") by τ ∈ {l, h}.
The high quality solves both types of problems, while the low quality is only sufficient for the minor problem. Different qualities come at different costs for the expert. Denoting the cost to the expert for providing the quality τ ∈ {l, h} by C τ , it holds that C l < C h . 4 For the quality he has provided the expert can charge one of two exogenously given prices, either P l or P h , with P l > C l , P h > C h , and P h P l . In what follows, we denote the index of the quality charged for (the expert's "charging decision") by η ∈ {l, h}. The price the expert charges does not need to correspond to the quality he has actually provided. That is, η can be different from τ . If the quality is sufficient, i.e. if τ = h for θ = h, or τ ∈ {l, h} for θ = l, the consumer receives a value of V > 0, otherwise she receives a value of zero. In the sequel we assume that V satisfies
(1) Fig. 1 . The baseline game with material payoffs, Γ B , where c denotes the consumer, e the expert, and n nature. The expert's choice is represented by (τ , η) , where τ is the index for the provided quality and η is the index for the charged price. Non-singleton information sets, that is the dashed lines, represent the consumer's terminal information. The expert's material payoff is the top value of the payoff vector, and the consumer's payoff is the bottom value of the payoff vector.
That V is larger than the first element in {·} makes sure that solving the major problem with the high-quality service is more efficient than leaving the major problem unsolved and that V is larger than the second element implies that, from an ex ante perspective, providing the high-quality service is more efficient than providing the low-quality one.
If an interaction takes place the material payoff of the consumer, denoted π c (τ , η|θ), is the value (of V or 0) minus the price for the quality charged for:
The material payoff of the expert in the case of interaction, π e (τ , η), corresponds to the price charged minus the cost of the quality provided: π e (τ , η) = P η − C τ for any (τ , η, θ) ∈ {l, h} 3 .
If no trade takes place both parties end up with a material payoff of zero. To make things interesting we assume that
This condition implies that if both players are exclusively interested in their own material payoffs and if this fact is common knowledge, then the consumer never accepts to be served, causing a breakdown of the market. See Subsection 2.4 for details.
The order of moves is shown in Fig. 1 . Prices are exogenously given and observed by both players. Based on this information the consumer decides whether to visit the expert or not. We denote this decision by m ∈ {a, r}, where a stands for acceptance and r for rejection. If the consumer interacts with the expert, a random move by nature determines the severity of her problem. The expert observes the severity and then decides which quality to provide and which price to charge. We define overcharging as charging for the high quality while providing the low one (τ = l, η = h|θ ∈ {l, h}), undertreatment as providing the low quality when the consumer has the major problem (τ = l, η ∈ {l, h}|θ = h), and overtreatment as providing the high quality when the consumer has the minor problem (τ = h, η ∈ {l, h}|θ = l).
Notice that in this game neither is the expert obliged to provide a quality that solves the consumer's problem, nor can the expert's action be (perfectly) verified. 5 We denote this baseline game by Γ B . In the sequel we modify it to two extended games, Γ P and Γ M .
Game with promise option, Γ P
In Γ P at the start of the game the expert has the option to make a non-binding promise p from the set P = {NO, SQ, AP, SQ&AP} to the consumer, where the elements of P are defined as follows 6 : 5 Only when the consumer has a major problem and the expert provides the low quality, the consumer can indirectly infer her problem type and the quality provided since then she receives no positive value. 6 A capital P stands for two different things in this paper: When it comes with a subscript (as in P l and P h ) it stands for a price, when it comes without a subscript (as in p ∈ P) it denotes the set of available promises in game Γ P and in experimental treatment T P .
NO ("no promise"): an irrelevant message; SQ ("sufficient quality"): a promise to provide sufficient quality; AP ("appropriate price"): a promise to charge the price for the quality provided; SQ&AP ("sufficient quality and appropriate price"): a promise to provide sufficient quality and to charge the price for the quality provided.
Promises have neither an effect on the available alternatives in the subgame starting after a promise has been made, nor an effect on the material payoffs players receive for any (τ , η, θ) ∈ {l, h} 3 . 7
Game with money-burning option, Γ M
In Γ M at the start of the game the consumer has the opportunity to choose a money-burning option m out of a finite set M = {0, , 2 , . . . , x }, where > 0 is some smallest currency unit and x some strictly positive integer satisfying x (V − P h − )/ . 8 That is, instead of deciding whether to visit the expert or not, (m ∈ {a, r}), the consumer is now allowed to choose a message m ∈ M ∪ {r}, where r stands again for rejecting interaction. In case of participation (m ∈ M), the sum m is deducted from the consumer's material payoff (but is not transferred to the expert), and the expert is informed about the magnitude of the sum before making his provision and charging decision. Accordingly, the consumer's material payoff in case of participation changes to π c (τ , η|θ) − m, while the expert's material payoff stays the same (as in Γ B ). 9
Standard predictions
Consider game Γ B . Suppose that both parties are rational, risk-neutral and care only for their own material payoffs, and that this is common knowledge. Then in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) the expert always provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality if the consumer accepts; anticipating this, the consumer decides against the visit of the expert (this follows from condition (2)), which leads to a market breakdown. The prediction for Γ P is basically the same: In this game the expert has a much larger strategy space -he now chooses a promise p from the set P at the start, and for each p and each θ he then chooses τ ∈ {l, h} and η ∈ {l, h} -but this does not have any effect on the predicted path:
The consumer knows that she will always receive the low quality and pay the high price whatever the promise of the expert is. So she will decide against participation, in case of participation p is arbitrary, and for any p we get undertreatment and overcharging just as in Γ B . The argument for Γ M is similar, also leading to a market breakdown.
The impact of guilt aversion on market outcomes
The predictions for our three games change significantly if the expert has a disposition to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer's payoff expectation. To show this we modify the expert's utility function to incorporate a guilt sentiment a là Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) . To translate their 'simple guilt' hypothesis to the present context consider the baseline game and let α a denote the consumer's initial (first-order) belief about the expert's provision and charging behavior in case of acceptance, and β a the expert's expectation of α a , conditional on the consumer's acceptance.
Then the expert's ex post utility for the case where the consumer has accepted, the expert has provided the quality C τ and charged the price P η , given the consumer has problem θ and the expert the belief β a , is assumed to be given by U e (τ , η|θ, β a ) = P η − C τ − γ max{E β a (π c (τ , η |θ)) − π c (τ , η|θ), 0}, where E β a is the conditional expectation operator given the belief β a and γ 0 is a psychological guilt-sensitivity parameter. We start by securing some facts that are true for any expectation the expert might hold and any value of the guilt-sensitivity parameter. To avoid a lot of conditional statements we strengthen for the rest of the paper our condition (1) by imposing in addition the requirement
which is fulfilled by the parameter constellations implemented in the experiment. Given this condition we get (all formal statements and proofs are in Appendix A):
Observation 1. If the consumer has the minor problem, then the expert strictly prefers providing the low over providing the high quality service.
Observation 1 tells us that the expert has never an incentive to overtreat the consumer. The reason is that overtreatment reduces the expert's material payoff but has no effect on the amount of guilt as it leaves the consumer's material payoff and her payoff expectation unaffected.
Observation 2. Generically, an expert who is willing to solve the consumer's problem in both states will charge the same price in both states.
Observation 2 implies that a guilt-averse expert will never provide the appropriate quality and charge the price for the quality provided in both states. 10 This follows (i) from the observation that the consumer's payoff expectation is necessarily an average over the payoffs in the two states and as such depends neither on the severity of her problem nor on the expert's provision behavior; and (ii) from the fact that -for the case where the consumer's problem is solved -her actual payoff does not depend on those variables either. Thus, for the case where the consumer's problem is solved, charging the low instead of the high price involves exactly the same trade-off for the expert in both states: The cost is material and amounts to P h − P l in both states, and the benefit consists in reducing the amount of guilt which is also the same in both states.
Observation 3. The expert will never undertreat the consumer and at the same time charge honestly. Moreover, if the expert prefers charging the low over charging the high price when he solves the major problem, then he also prefers solving the consumer's major problem over letting it unsolved.
Observation 3 is important because it implies that undertreatment is easier to prevent than overcharging. The reason is that overcharging involves a pure (1:1) transfer of money from the customer to the expert while undertreatment involves a transfer that is associated with an efficiency loss. Thus, for an expert not to have an incentive to overcharge, the material payoff of the customer must receive at least the same weight in the expert's utility function as the expert's own material payoff. A necessary condition for this to be the case is a value of the guilt-sensitivity parameter γ of at least 1. Together with the belief that the consumer has a high payoff expectation this condition is also sufficient. By contrast, if the expert undertreats the customer then his material payoff increases by C h − C l , while the material payoff of the customer decreases by V > C h − C l . Thus, for a given (high) payoff expectation of the customer a lower value of γ is sufficient to prevent undertreatment. 11 Observations 1-3 together imply that generically the expert's behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted is of one of the following three types:
• type-1 behavior: the expert provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality in both states; • type-2 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem and he charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-3 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem and he charges the price for the low quality in both states.
Guilt aversion in the baseline game, Γ B
We explore the impact of guilt aversion in Γ B under two conditions. In the first condition, we assume that players coordinate on a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (hereafter PBE). The notion of PBE implies that players never change their beliefs about the beliefs of their opponents along the predicted path. As Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) argue in their pioneering paper on dynamic psychological games, however, this implication might be considered as questionable in a psychological game. Hence, in our second condition we relax the consistency condition of PBE to allow the expert to change his second-order belief when he observes an unexpected move by the consumer. Specifically, we allow the expert to draw inferences about the consumer's unobservable first-order belief from her observable participation decision via forward-induction reasoning.
Equilibrium analysis in Γ B . Given the findings above and the requirement that in equilibrium beliefs of all orders have to be consistent with actual behavior, it is straightforward to prove that generically the baseline game admits three types of PBE: (i) type-1 equilibria in which the consumer rejects and the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance; (ii) type-2 equilibria in which the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance; and (iii) type-3 equilibria in which the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-3 behavior in case of acceptance. The bounds for existence of each of the three types of PBE are as shown in Fig. 2 . As can be seen from this figure, for relatively low values 10 An exception is the case where the expert is exactly indifferent between charging the low and charging the high price and when he is indifferent then he is so in both states. However, for any belief the expert might hold, this case is non-generic as it is consistent with at most a single realization of the guilt-sensitivity parameter. 11 Note that invoking "guilt from blame" (as defined in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) would qualitatively yield the same prediction: A player suffering "guilt from blame" cares about others' inferences regarding the extent to which he is willing to let them down. Since undertreatment is observable while overcharging is not (except for the case where it comes together with undertreatment; see the information sets on terminal nodes in Fig. 1 ) an expert suffering guilt from blame has more incentives to avoid undertreatment than overcharging. of the guilt-sensitivity parameter γ there is a unique PBE and the behavior in that PBE implies market breakdown, just as in the selfish benchmark of Subsection 2.4. In an intermediate range both market breakdown (supported by the expectation that the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance) and acceptance (supported by the belief that the expert exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance) are consistent with equilibrium. And for relatively high values of γ the market necessarily works well: the consumer accepts and she gets the appropriate treatment in any PBE.
Forward-induction reasoning in Γ B . Following Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) consider the following psychological forward-induction argument: Suppose the consumer accepts. If she is rational, she must believe that the expert behaves in a way that implies a material payoff of at least 0 for her -since this is what she receives if she rejects. Thus, even if the expert is initially uncertain regarding the customer's expectation, if he believes that the consumer is rational, then he infers E α a (π c ) 0 from her acceptance. Thus, E β a (π c ) 0, which in turn implies that for values of the guilt-sensitivity parameter γ above the threshold (C h − C l )/P h type-1 behavior is dominated by type-2 behavior. It follows that for any γ > (C h − C l )/P h only type-2 and type-3 equilibria are consistent with forward-induction reasoning in Γ B .
Guilt aversion in the game with promise option, Γ P
Again, we explore the impact of guilt aversion under two conditions, first under the (equilibrium) assumption that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if believing in the promise is consistent with equilibrium; and then under the (non-equilibrium) assumption that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) whatever their content is.
Equilibrium analysis in Γ P . Under the assumptions that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if believing in the promise is consistent with equilibrium, promises NO and SQ&AP never have any effect, the former because it has no content and the latter because generically there is no PBE in which the expert provides sufficient quality and charges the price for the quality provided in both states. By contrast, the impact of promises SQ and AP on the expert's behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted depends on the realization of γ . For values of γ in the range
, promise SQ selects the type-2 equilibrium, while AP selects the type-1 equilibrium. Since type-1 equilibrium involves rejection while type-2 equilibrium entails profitable trade, the model predicts that the expert makes promise SQ and that he exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance. Our model makes no prediction for other values of γ .
Non-equilibrium analysis in Γ P . Suppose now that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) whatever their content is. Specifically, assume that for any promise p ∈ P the consumer expects that, in case of acceptance, the expert maximizes lexicographically, first his own material payoff subject to the constraint that his promise is kept, and secondly (in case of a tie in own material payoffs) the payoff of the consumer (over the options that yield him the same material payoff). Further assume that the expert expects that the consumer has such beliefs. For this expectation it is straightforward to show that the expert's behavior for the case where the consumer has accepted after promise p ∈ P is as shown in Fig. 3 .
First notice that the promise NO yields rejection. Thus, the expert will never use this promise if he expects that promises are believed. Next notice that SQ strictly dominates SQ&AP for any γ > 0. To see this, first note that both promises yield acceptance by the consumer. Furthermore, for γ > 1/q l the promise SQ&AP implies a lower price for the consumer than SQ at a material cost for the expert, but exactly the same amount of guilt; and for γ 1/q l both promises yield exactly the same behavior (and thereby also the same material payoff for the expert), but SQ&AP yields a higher payoff expectation and therewith a higher amount of guilt than SQ . Thus, promise SQ&AP will never be made if it is expected to be believed. So we are left with the promises in the set {SQ, AP} and conclude that the expert will make one of these promises and that the promise made by the expert is accepted by the consumer. Thus, promises are predicted to increase the frequency of trade under this condition. Fig. 3 . The consequences of promises in the game with promise option, Γ P , with the assumption that promises are believed to be believed. In the figure AP UT stands for the promise AP under an undertreatment price-vector (i.e. P h − C h < P l − C l ). The behavior after the promise AP under an overtreatment price-vector (defined by P h − C h > P l − C l ) is the same as after promise SQ , and the behavior under an equal mark-up vector (defined by
is the same as after SQ&AP.
Guilt aversion in the game with money-burning option, Γ M
Equilibrium analysis in Γ M . It is easily verified that the type of behavior consistent with equilibrium in the subgame starting after the consumer has sent message m ∈ M does not depend on the amount of money burned by the consumer.
Whether actual money burning is consistent with equilibrium depends on the extent to which the expert is guilt averse.
For γ < (C h − C l )/V there is no equilibrium in which the consumer decides for an m ∈ { , . . . , x } (she knows that, in case of acceptance, the expert always provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality for any m ∈ M, and therefore decides for m = r); for γ ∈ ((C h − C l )/q l V , 1) there is no PBE in which she decides for such an m either (she knows that, in case of acceptance, the expert always provides the appropriate quality and charges the price for the high quality for any m ∈ M, and therefore decides for m = 0). For the remaining ranges of γ there is equilibrium multiplicity and actual money burning is consistent with PBE.
Forward-induction reasoning in Γ M . We now show that iterated forward-induction reasoning has quite some power in our money-burning game. Specifically, we show that the path predicted by (iterated) forward induction is unique for any
, 1) and that the predicted path involves full efficiency (interaction followed by appropriate service) without money burning. We start by showing that -for guilt-sensitivity parameters in this range -for any m = r only type-2 behavior is consistent with the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. To see this, first suppose the consumer burns the maximal feasible amount, x . If the expert is rational and believes in the rationality of the consumer, then he infers from this move that the consumer expects at least x . Therefore, E β x (π c ) x . In Appendix A we show that an expert with such an expectation necessarily provides the high quality service to a consumer who has the major problem for any γ > (C h − C l )/(P h + x ). Thus, for guilt-sensitivity parameters in this range, burning x gives the consumer a payoff of V − P h − x for sure. Taking the same logic one step further, suppose now the consumer burns the amount (x − 1) . Then the expert infers from that that the consumer expects at least V − P h − x . This is so because -if both the expert and the consumer accept the above reasoning -they believe that by burning the amount x the consumer can guarantee a material payoff of at least V − P h − x . Hence, burning less money is consistent with common knowledge of rationality only if it does not yield less. Now, we can apply the same logic to show that the expert treats the consumer appropriately, even when she burns only the amount (x − 1) . Proceeding this way further we get to the prediction that for any m 0 (even for m = 0!) the expert treats the consumer appropriately. Anticipating appropriate treatment for any m 0, the consumer decides not to burn any money (that is, to choose m = 0). Thus, actually burning money is not necessary to shape second-order beliefs and behavior; knowing that a money-burning option was available to the consumer is sufficient to induce consumer-friendly behavior.
Experimental design
At the beginning of our experiment, subjects were informed about their (fixed) role as either an expert or a consumer, and they received an initial endowment of 200 experimental currency units (ECU), equivalent to 2.5 Euro. Each session was run with 16 subjects who were split into two matching groups of 8 subjects each, yielding two independent observations per session. In each matching group, four subjects had the role of an expert, and the other four that of a consumer. Experts only interacted with consumers in the same matching group. The consumer's probability of having the minor problem was q l = 0.5 and the value for receiving a sufficient quality was V = 100 ECU. The cost of providing the low quality was C l = 0 ECU, and the cost of providing the high quality was C h = 30 ECU. Each expert was exposed to each price-vector ( P l , P h ) in the set {(30, 50), (30, 60), (30, 70), (30, 65), (40, 65), (50, 65)} four times, two times with the consumer having a minor problem and two times with the consumer having a major problem. 12 In total this sums up to 24 rounds for each subject, and the profits from all rounds were added up to yield the total payoffs. The sequence of (price-vector, problem)-pairs was randomized on the individual expert's level.
We had three different treatments -denoted T B , T P and T M -which correspond to our three games Γ B , Γ P and Γ M , as described in Section 2. More details on treatments follow below. The experiment was run in June 2009. All sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruiting was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Four sessions were conducted for treatments T B , and T P , and five for treatment T M . In total we had 208 undergraduate students from the University of Innsbruck participating in the experiment. At the beginning of each session, the instructions (see Appendix B) were read aloud to make them common knowledge. Subjects were also given about 10 minutes to read through the instructions alone and ask questions. Before the experiment started, subjects had to answer a set of control questions, and the experiment proceeded only after all control questions were answered correctly. Each session, including instructions and control questions, lasted on average 1 hour and 15 minutes, and subjects' average earnings, including a show up fee of 5 Euro, were 15 Euro.
Description and prediction for baseline treatment, T B
In treatment T B , which corresponds to game Γ B , at the beginning of each round, an expert was randomly paired with a consumer, and both got to know the price-vector (P l , P h ). Then the consumer could decide whether she would like to interact with the expert or not. If the consumer decided to interact with the expert, the expert got to know the problem of the consumer and decided which quality to provide and which price to charge. At the end of each round both the consumer and the expert were informed of their own payoffs. Based on the theoretical analysis in Section 3 our prediction for T B is 13 :
Prediction 1 (Behavior in baseline treatment). P1a: Conditional on acceptance (m = r), the expert exhibits either (1) type-1 behavior: he provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality in both states; or (2) type-2 behavior: he provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem, and he charges the price for the high quality in both states; or (3) type-3 behavior: he provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem and he charges the price for the low quality in both states. Overtreatment (provision of the high quality if the consumer has the minor problem) is rarely observed for any price constellation. P1b: If psychological forward induction works, type-2 behavior becomes more and type-1 behavior becomes less frequent when P h increases; by contrast, the frequency of type-3 behavior does not depend on P h .
Description and prediction for treatment with promise option, T P
In the treatment T P , which corresponds to game Γ P , the expert was given an opportunity to send one of the following four messages after having observed the price-vector 14 :
NO: "Hello". SQ : "I promise I will provide a sufficient quality". AP: "I promise I will charge the low price if I provide the low quality, and I will charge the high price if I provide the high quality". SQ&AP: "I promise I will provide the low quality and charge for it if you have the minor problem, and I will provide the high quality and charge for it if you have the major problem".
Based on the theoretical analysis in the previous section our prediction for T P is:
Prediction 2 (The effect of giving the expert an option to make a promise). P2a: Promise SQ is frequently observed in T P , while promises NO and SQ&AP are rarely observed. P2b: Compared to the baseline treatment T B consumers are more likely to accept in T P after promises SQ and SQ&AP and less likely to accept after promise NO. P2c: Conditional on acceptance (m = r), the expert is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner in T P than in T B . Furthermore, in T P the expert is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner after promises SQ and SQ&AP than after promises NO and AP UT . 15
Description and prediction for treatment with money-burning option, T M
In the treatment T M , which corresponds to game Γ M , the consumer could decide whether she would like to interact with the expert or not. If not, the game ended and both got zero payment for this particular round. If yes, the consumer 13 While introducing psychological guilt aversion into our simple credence goods model would allow for sharp point predictions, we formulate weaker statements to illustrate the qualitative effects that we expect from guilt aversion. For instance, we translate the point prediction (from Observation 1) that an expert never overtreats a customer into the weaker statement that overtreatment is rarely observed. 14 The exact wording of the experimental instructions (see Appendix B) refers to the consumer's two problems as "Problem I" (minor problem) and "Problem II" (major problem), and to the two qualities of the good as "Solution I" (low quality) and "Solution II" (high quality). In the text we rephrase the wording so that it matches the terminology used in the theory part of the paper. could voluntarily pay an "interaction price" m from the discrete set M = {0, 5, 10, . . . , 30} to the experimenter. That is, in the notation introduced in the theory section, we had = 5 and x = 6 in our treatment T M . 16 Based on our theoretical analysis our prediction for T M would be that the consumer either rejects, or accepts without burning money. This extreme prediction is based on iterated forward-induction reasoning which requires -for each additional iteration -that players' knowledge of each others' rationality is one level deeper. Results from previous experiments -e.g., on Nagel's guessing game (see Nagel, 1995 , or Ho et al., 1998 ) -suggest that assuming so much sophistication probably means assuming too much. How does the prediction for T M change if we apply forward-induction reasoning (requiring only two layers of mutual knowledge of rationality) without iteration? Then, if the consumer burns the amount y, the expert infers from this that the consumer expects at least y. That is, in this case we get an increasing relationship between the amount of money the consumer burns and the lower bound on the second-order belief of the expert. Based on this reasoning (and the arguments in the theory section) our prediction for T M is:
Prediction 3 (The effect of giving the consumer an option to burn money). P3a: Compared to the baseline treatment T B consumers are more willing to accept (that is, to choose an m ∈ {0, 5, 10, . . . , 30}) in T M . P3b: Message m = 0 is frequently observed in T M , while messages in {5, 10, . . . , 30} are rarely observed. P3c: Conditional on acceptance (m = r), the expert is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner in T M than in T B . Furthermore, in T M the expert is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner when P h is higher and when the consumer burns a higher amount of money.
Experimental results
In reporting the experimental results we proceed in the same order as in previous sections. That is, we start with the baseline treatment, then discuss the effect of introducing an opportunity to make a promise, and finally report the effects of allowing for a money-burning option. 17 Given that our games are rather complex when being exposed to them for the first time (in particular in treatments with promise options or money-burning options) we concentrate in the subsequent analysis on the final 20 rounds (i.e., rounds 5-24), thus considering rounds 1-4 as an opportunity for subjects to gather experience with the game. When we have an ex ante directional hypothesis we use a one-sided test, otherwise a two-sided test.
Results for the baseline treatment, T B
Testing predictions P1a and P1b directly is difficult, because they refer to complete strategies, while we can only observe an expert's provision and charging decision in one of the two states. We therefore proceed as follows. First, we check whether the aggregate data is qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions that (i) a consumer with the minor problem will always receive the low quality service (no overtreatment), and that (ii) undertreatment always comes together with overcharging. Next we exploit the fact that the major problem allows for a neat identification of the behavioral type, while the minor problem does not. Specifically, in analyzing the data we use the fact that for the case where the consumer has the major problem, type-1 behavior yields undertreatment and overcharging, type-2 behavior implies appropriate quality and charging for the quality provided, and type-3 behavior yields appropriate quality and charging the price for the low quality. Consistent with the theoretical prediction overtreatment is rarely observed -overall, it occurred in less than 2% of the possible cases. Also, undertreatment almost always came together with overcharging -undertreatment with honest charging occurred in only about 3% of possible cases. Identifying the relative frequencies of type-1, type-2, and type-3 behavior by looking at experts' choices when they faced a major problem, we see (in Table 1 ) that 73% of the choices are consistent with type-1 behavior, 24% of the choices are consistent with type-2 behavior, and less than 1% of the choices are consistent with type-3 behavior. Thus, type-3 behavior is practically absent while the rest of P1a is largely confirmed. 16 Note that an "interaction price" of 0 results in trade; thus, m = 0 is different from opting out (m = r). 17 In the working paper version of this paper we also present a treatment that combines promises (by the expert) and money burning (by the consumer).
For reasons of succinctness, we do not report this treatment here but refer the interested reader to Beck et al. (2010) . In our experiment, P h can take the value of 50, 60, 65, and 70. Prediction P1b says that if psychological forward induction works then type-2 behavior should become more and type-1 behavior less frequent when P h increases. To see the effects of P h on provision behavior, we computed the relative frequencies of type-1, type-2, and type-3 behavior for the four values of P h , again using choices when experts faced a major problem for identification. As we can see from Table 1 , there is no evidence supporting P1b (one-sided Wilcoxon tests are insignificant). 18 Table 2 reports the relative frequencies of promises in treatment T P . Consistent with P2a, we see that promise SQ is (with 53% of possible observations) frequently made, while NO is (with 7%) rarely made. The distribution of promises is also significantly different from a random one (χ 2 test: p < 0.01). As we can see from Table 2 , the kind of promise made does not depend on the price-vector. A surprising observation is that a significant proportion of promises (26%) were SQ&AP which is a dominated promise for an expert suffering from 'simple guilt'. Even more surprising, this message becomes more popular in later rounds, as can be seen in Fig. 4 . This figure displays the development of the four promises over time and shows that while the relative frequency of SQ and AP remains rather constant, it is increasing for SQ&AP and decreasing for NO. One possible explanation for this observation is that experts -instead of suffering from 'simple guilt' -suffer 18 We also searched for evidence in support of P1b at the individual level. For instance, defining an expert to be guilt averse if he provides the high quality in at least x% of cases where he faces a consumer with the major problem, we asked -for different values of x -whether guilt-averse experts behaved in a more consumer-friendly manner when P h is higher. We found no evidence in support of P1b either. 19 Also, if consumers believe in a promise whatever its content is, then they are more willing to accept after SQ&AP than after SQ, giving (selfish) experts an incentive to make the promise SQ&AP. This yields a second explanation for the prevalence of SQ&AP. We will discuss alternative explanations in Section 6.
Results for treatment with promise options, T P
To test prediction P2b we compare interaction rates. The interaction rate is defined as the relative frequency with which consumers accept to trade with an expert. In treatment T P it is with 0.85 weakly significantly larger than in T B with 0.81 (one-sided Wilcoxon test based on 8 independent observations, p = 0.09), see Table 4 . One reason for the weak effect of promises in T P against T B is perhaps that the interaction rate is already rather high in the baseline treatment. The scope of a further increase in the interaction rate is therefore limited. Another possibility is that messages, despite our efforts of making them rich and endogenous, might still be perceived as 'bare'. Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) argue that bare promises are virtually ineffective. When calculating the interaction rates after promise NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP separately, we see that it is 0.47 after promise NO, 0.90 after promise SQ , 0.82 after promise AP, and 0.85 after promise SQ&AP. Thus, by making the right sort of promise (SQ ) the probability of an interaction not taking place is halved (relative to the baseline treatment), while by making the wrong promise (NO) this probability is more than doubled. Comparing the interaction rates with promises to the corresponding value in the baseline treatment with one-sided Wilcoxon tests we find that the difference is significant for promise NO (0.47 after NO vs 0.81 in the baseline, p = 0.001), but not significant for the other promises (p > 0.10). 20 Since some matching groups only had very few observations for specific promises, we also ran a Probit regression with random effects in order to see more clearly the effects of promises and to compare them directly to the baseline treatment. The dependent variable is the binary interaction value, 0 or 1. The independent variables include a dummy variable for the treatment with money-burning options, T B (to be discussed below), and four dummy variables for the promises NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP. Random effects are on the level of the individual consumer. The results of the regression are reported in Table 3 . As we can see from this table, compared to the baseline treatment T B consumers are significantly more likely to accept after promises SQ and SQ&AP and less likely to accept after promise NO. The interaction rate after promise AP is not significantly different from that of the baseline treatment T B . Thus, consumers' acceptance behavior is largely consistent with P2b. Table 3 also shows that the consumer's acceptance is significantly decreasing over time (by about 2 percentage points per period), indicating that consumers shy away more often from interaction the more experience they have gained in the market.
To test prediction P2c we shall use two proxies to capture how consumer-friendly an expert is: the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate. The undertreatment rate is defined as the ratio of cases where the consumer actually got undertreated (having the major problem and receiving the low quality) over all cases where the consumer agreed to interact and had the major problem. The honesty rate is defined as the ratio of honest behavior (getting the needed quality and paying accordingly) over all cases with interaction. 21 Table 4 compares treatments T B and T P . The aggregate picture emerging from the first two columns suggests that the possibility to make promises decreases the undertreatment rate and increases the honesty rate. However, none of these differences between T P and T B is statistically significant (one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: p > 0.10). Compared to experts' behavior after promise NO, experts were significantly more friendly after promise SQ : the undertreatment rate decreases from 1.00 to 0.49 and the honesty rate increases from 0.00 to 0.24 (p < 0.01 for both). Experts' behavior after promise SQ&AP is weakly significantly more friendly than after promise NO: the undertreatment rate decreases from 1.00 to 0.71 and the honesty rate rises from 0.00 to 0.16 (p < 0.10 for both). Column AP UT of Table 4 displays the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate after promise AP when experts faced undertreatment price-vectors ((30, 50) , (40, 65) , (50, 65) ). In line with prediction P2c experts behave significantly more friendly after promise SQ than after promise AP UT : the undertreatment rate decreases from 0.76 to 0.49 (p < 0.01) and the honesty rate rises from 0.14 to 0.24 (p = 0.016). However, 19 An expert suffering guilt from blame cares about how strongly the consumer thinks that the expert intended to harm her. Since overcharging remains unobservable, the consumer might hold the belief that the expert always charges appropriately. Under this belief, she would assign blame for the high price to nature having chosen the major problem and the expert would therefore never feel guilty from being blamed for overcharging. 20 The effects of promises on experts' payoffs are largely the same as the effects of promises on interaction rates. 21 The overcharging rate, defined as the ratio of cases where consumers actually got overcharged (paying the high price while receiving the low quality) over all cases where consumers agreed to interact with the expert and received the low quality could also be used as a proxy for consumer-friendliness. We dropped it from the analysis because it is very close to 1.00 in all treatments, leaving the treatment effects untestable. experts do not behave significantly differently after promise AP UT than after promise SQ&AP (p > 0.10 for the comparison of the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate).
Results for treatment with money-burning option, T M
We now turn to the effects of giving the consumer a money-burning option. The evidence for P3a is, at best, weak. Compared to the baseline treatment T B , the interaction rate is slightly higher in treatment T M . The difference is not significant when using one-sided Wilcoxon test with 8 independent observations (0.81 in T B vs 0.84 in T M , p > 0.10), but is significant in a Probit regression when controlling for heterogeneity of consumers (see Table 3 ). Consistent with P3b, we find that among the cases where consumers accept, message m = 0 is observed much more frequently (with 76% of cases) than messages in {5, 10, . . . , 30} (with 24%) . Recall that, for guilt-sensitivity parameter γ ∈
), both type-1 and type-2 behavior is consistent with psychological forward-induction reasoning in the baseline game, while only type-2 behavior is consistent with it in T M for any m ∈ {0, 5, . . . , 30}. Thus, if the mass of experts with γ ∈
and if multiplicity in predicted paths results in some players coordinating on one and others on the other path, we would expect significantly more consumer-friendly behavior in T M than in T B . Comparing T M with T B we find, however, that experts did not behave in a more consumer-friendly way: the undertreatment rate even rises from 0.77 to 0.83 while the honesty rate decreases from 0.14 to 0.10, though both comparisons are not significant (p > 0.10). Finally, P3c suggests that in T M experts are more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner when P h is higher and when the consumer burns more money. To test the first part of this hypothesis, we compared the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate when P h is low ( P h = 50, 60) to the corresponding values when P h is high ( P h = 65, 70). In line with the prediction a higher P h leads to more consumer-friendly behavior: When P h is low, the average undertreatment rate is 0.89 and the average honesty rate is 0.05, while when P h is high the corresponding values are 0.78 and 0.12. One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that the differences are significant (p = 0.06 for undertreatment rate and p = 0.04 for honesty rate), lending some support to prediction P3c (see Table 5 ). To test the second part of the hypothesis (derived under the assumption that forward induction works, but iterated forward induction does not) we compared the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate for m = 0 to the corresponding values for m 5. Qualitatively in line with the prediction, burning money leads to more consumer-friendly behavior: For m 5 the average undertreatment rate is 0.78 and the average honesty rate is 0.12, while the corresponding values for m = 0 are 0.83 and 0.02. None of these differences is statistically significant, however. 22 The forward-induction argument is tricky, and arguably takes some time to figure out. We therefore also searched for interesting time trends, but failed to find any. Thus, our overall conclusion regarding the money-burning option is that giving the consumer such an option has at best a minor effect.
Discussion and conclusion
Credence goods markets are characterized by informational asymmetries between consumers and experts, which can lead to various forms of fraud, such as undertreatment, overtreatment, or overcharging. Dulleck et al. (2011) have investigated the role of institutions and market conditions on experts' behavior and have shown that liability is important for efficiency on credence goods markets, while ex post verifiability of the expert's actions is not. The impact of soft factors, such as giving the expert an option to make a promise to consumers, has been ignored so far as potentially important for improving efficiency on credence goods markets.
Soft factors such as non-binding promises have no effect on market behavior if all players are rational and only interested in their own material payoff, and if this fact is common knowledge. However, if agents have belief-dependent preferences, soft factors might become behaviorally relevant. This paper has focused on a specific kind of belief-dependent motivation, aversion against 'simple guilt' -as formally modeled by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) . Specifically, it has tested the effects of two devices that are predicted to have no impact on behavior if agents have standard preferences, but have the power to manipulate beliefs and are therefore predicted to have an impact if players are guilt averse: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expert's behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path.
The results from an experiment with 208 participants confirm the behavioral relevance of promises. Most experts make the predicted promise and proper promises induce more consumer-friendly behavior. Also, by making the right sort of promise (SQ ) the probability of an interaction not taking place is halved (relative to the baseline treatment), while by making the wrong promise (NO) this probability is more than doubled. While our data are largely in line with the predictions derived from guilt aversion theory, it is important to mention that 'simple guilt' cannot explain every detail of our data. Notably, making the promise SQ&AP is inconsistent with the hypothesis that experts suffer from simple guilt, yet this message is fairly popular and becomes even more frequent over time, and is associated with high acceptance rates. A possible explanation is that experts -instead of suffering from 'simple guilt' -have an aversion against 'guilt from blame' (as defined in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) , and that consumers anticipate that. An alternative explanation is that experts dislike disappointing consumer's behavior expectations. While the hypothesis that players are inclined not to hurt others relative to their payoff expectations and the alternative story that players are inclined not to hurt others relative to their behavior expectations are indistinguishable in the simple environments usually studied in lab experiments, they yield different predictions in our richer credence good game. The empirical relevance of guilt based on behavior expectations (which allows for state-dependent payoff expectations while the current version of guilt aversion does not) seems worth exploring in future research. 23 A further explanation for the prominence of promise SQ&AP is that a promise has (and is expected to have) a commitment value which is independent of its impact on the expectation of the consumer (as in Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004 , for instance), or that experts have an expectations-unrelated aversion against lying (Gneezy, 2005) . As it should be expected, our data cannot give a clear-cut answer to the question which of these alternative explanations for promise-keeping is responsible for the prominence of the promise SQ&AP. More generally, we consider it unlikely that a single theory is able to explain all instances of promise-keeping across contexts and subjects and we think that more research is needed to find out which of the mentioned motivational stories is empirically relevant for which fraction of subjects in which context. 24 Concerning the second device to influence the behavior of experts, we fail to confirm the behavioral relevance of allowing for a money-burning option of the consumer. The theoretical prediction here would have been that giving the consumer an opportunity to burn money changes the behavior of the expert even when the option is not used. That this prediction is not supported by our data is perhaps not surprising -after all it relies on iterated forward induction and thereby requires many layers of mutual knowledge of rationality. Perhaps more surprising is the observation that the milder hypothesis (requiring only two layers of mutual knowledge of rationality) that consumers who burn more money are treated better is not supported by the data either. 25 Our overall conclusion is that promises are behaviorally relevant but that their impact cannot be explained by the theory of 'simple guilt' alone, and that money burning is less powerful in practice than in theory. 23 A previous version of this paper contains a model of guilt based on behavior expectations. 24 Some important steps in that direction have already been done -for instance, by Vanberg (2008) who presents a nice experimental design intended to discriminate between the expectation-and the commitment-based explanation for promise-keeping, and by Ellingsen et al. (2010) who directly test the expectation-based explanation. 25 This is, however, somewhat in line with earlier findings that the size of player 1's outside option in 'lost wallet games' does not affect player 2's response behavior; see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) , Cox et al. (2010) .
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Formal results for the baseline game, Γ B
Consider the baseline game, Γ B . Let σ e = (σ τ ,η|θ ) (τ ,η,θ) ∈{l,h} 3 denote a mixed strategy of the expert, where σ τ ,η|θ stands for the probability with which the expert provides quality C τ and charges price P η , given the consumer has accepted and has problem θ . Similarly, let α a = (α τ ,η|θ ) (τ ,η,θ) ∈{l,h} 3 denote the consumer's initial (first-order) belief about the expert's behavior in case of acceptance, where α τ ,η|θ stands for the probability the consumer assigns to the event that the expert provides quality C τ and charges price P η , given she has problem θ . Finally, let β a = (β τ ,η|θ ) (τ ,η,θ) ∈{l,h} 3 denote the expert's expectation of α a , conditional on the consumer's acceptance.
We start by proving formal versions of the three observations in the main text. For this purpose, let (τ , η|θ) (τ , η |θ) stand for the statement "the expert prefers (τ , η) over (τ , η ) in state θ ", and define the symmetric (∼) and the asymmetric ( ) relation similarly. Then:
Observation 1. For any β a and any γ , (l, l|l) (h, l|l) and (l, h|l) (h, h|l) .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First suppose (l, l|l) (h, l|l). Then
which is in violation of the assumption C h > C l . The proof for (l, h|l) (h, h|l) is similar. 2 Observation 2. For any β a and any γ , [(l, l|l) [(l, h|l) 
]. Furthermore, for any β a , [(l, l|l) ∼ (l, h|l) ⇔ (h, l|h) ∼ (h, h|h)], and (l, l|l) ∼ (l, h|l) for at most a single value of γ .
Proof. The first part of the statement follows from the fact that E β a (π c ) does not depend on the realizations of η and θ and that -for the case where the consumer's problem is solved -her actual payoff does not depend on the realization of those variables either. Thus, when the expert decides to solve the consumer's problem then charging P l instead of P h involves exactly the same costs and benefit in both states; in both states the cost is material and amounts to P h − P l , and in both states the benefit consists in reducing the psychological cost by γ max{E β a (π c ) − (V − P h ), 0} γ (P h − P l ). This latter consideration also implies that for each β a , indifference is consistent with at most a single value of γ :
Observation 3 (part a). For any β a and any γ , (l, l|h) (l, h|h) ⇒ (h, h|h) (l, l|h).
Proof. First note that (l, l|h) 
Now E β a (π c ) q l V − P h ∀β a ; furthermore, q l V − P h + P l 0, by assumption (3). Thus, E β a (π c ) + P h E β a (π c ) + P l 0, implying that the above inequality reduces to γ 1. Now suppose (l, l|h) (h, h|h) , in violation of the claim. Then (1), the LHS of this inequality is strictly smaller than 1, contradicting γ 1. 2 Observation 3 (part b). For any β a and any γ , (h, l|h) 
Proof. From the proof of Observation 2 we know that (h, l|h) 
where the former equality follows from E β a (π c ) > V − P h > 0 and the latter (again) from E β a (π c ) V − P l ∀β a . But
, where the last inequality follows from the lower bound on γ mentioned at the start of the proof. But 0 P h − C h + C l + γ (V − P h ) + (γ − 1)P l is inconsistent with P h > C h , C l 0, V P h , γ 1 and P l 0. Next suppose (l, h|h) (l, l|h) , in violation of the claim. Then
where the ⇔ follows from the lower bound on E(π c ) given at the start of the proof (which implies that the max operator selects the first term in {.} on both sides of the inequality). But γ < 1 violates the lower bound on γ given at the start of the proof. 2
Observations 1, 2, 3a and 3b together imply the following result:
Lemma 1. Generically, the expert's behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted is of one of the following three types:
• type-1 behavior: the expert provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-2 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if the consumer has the major problem, and he charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-3 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if the consumer has the major problem, and he charges the price for the low quality in both states.
Given Lemma 1, the requirement that in equilibrium beliefs of all orders have to be consistent with actual behavior, and the facts that
it is straightforward to prove the following results 26 :
Proposition 1a. Generically the baseline game Γ B admits three types of PBE:
• in type-1 equilibria the consumer rejects and the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance;
• in type-2 equilibria the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance;
• in type-3 equilibria the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-3 behavior in case of acceptance.
The bounds for existence of each of the three types of PBE are shown in Fig. 2. Proof. We derive the bounds for existence of each of the three types of equilibria in turn.
Bounds for type-1 equilibrium:
In a type-1 equilibrium E α a (π c ) = E β a (π c ) = q l V − P h . We have to show that for this expectation type-1 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ (C h − C l )/q l V , while it is suboptimal outside this range. For θ = l Observation 1 implies that we only need to show that for the above expectation and for guilt-sensitivity parameters in the given range we have (l, h, |l) (l, l|l) . Suppose not. Then
which violates the assumption that P h P l . For θ = h the fact that (l, h|l) (l, l|l) (together with Observation 2) implies that we need to check that (l, h|h) (h, h|h) and (l, h|h) (l, l|h) hold for parameters within the stated range and that at least one of these restrictions is violated for parameters outside the range. First note that (l, h|h) 
Bounds for type-2 equilibrium: In a type-2 equilibrium E α a (π c ) = E β a (π c ) = V − P h . We have to show that for this expectation type-2 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ (C h − C l )/V , while it is suboptimal outside this range. For θ = l the check is exactly the same as for type-1 equilibrium. For θ = h we need to check that (h, h|h) (l, h|h) and (h, h|h) (l, l|h) hold for parameters within the stated range and that at least one of these restrictions is violated for γ < (C h − C l )/V . First note that (h, h|h) 
Bounds for type-3 equilibrium: In a type-3 equilibrium E α a (π c ) = E β a (π c ) = V − P l . We have to show that for this expectation type-3 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ 1, while it is suboptimal outside this range. For θ = l we need only to check that for this expectation and those values of γ we have (l, l|l) 
and Observation 3 together imply that we need only to check (h, l|h) 
Proposition 1b. For any γ > (C h − C l )/P h only type-2 and type-3 equilibria are consistent with forward-induction reasoning in Γ B .
Proof. Suppose the consumer accepts. If she is rational, she must believe that the expert behaves in a way that implies a material payoff of at least 0 for her. Thus, if the expert believes that the consumer is rational, then he infers E α a (π c ) 0 from her acceptance. Thus, E β a (π c ) 0. The proof that E β a (π c ) 0 together with γ > (C h 0} . Now the RHS of this inequality is minimal when E β a (π c ) > V − P h . For this case the inequality reduces to γ (C h − C l )/V , which is inconsistent with V > P h (by assumption (1)) and γ > (C h − C l )/P h . The proof that the two inequalities 26 For completeness we mention the existence of two non-generic pure-strategy PBE, one in which the expert always provides the appropriate quality and charges accordingly and one in which he always provides the appropriate quality and always charges the "wrong" price. However, since each of those equilibria exists only at a single point [the former at γ = 1/q l , the latter at γ = 1/(1 − q l )] we ignore them in the sequel.
at the start of the proof also imply (h, l|h) (l, l|h) is again by contradiction. Suppose (l, l|h) (h, l|h) .
Formal results for the game with promise option, Γ P Proposition 2a. Consider the game Γ P . Suppose promises act as equilibrium selection devices. Then for any γ ∈ [(C h − C l )/V , (C h − C l )/q l V ] the expert makes promise SQ and exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance. For parameter values outside this range the promise is arbitrary and has no effect on expert's behavior.
Proof. Under the assumptions that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if believing in the promise is consistent with equilibrium, promises NO and SQ&AP never have any effect, the former because it has no content and the latter because generically there is no PBE in which the expert provides sufficient quality and charges the price for the quality provided in both states. 27 By contrast, the impact of promises SQ and AP on the expert's behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted depends on the realization of γ . For γ < (C h − C l )/V and for γ ∈ ((C h − C l )/q l V , 1) those promises have no effect because there is a unique prediction in those ranges anyway -see Fig. 2 . For γ 1 they have no effect either; for SQ this follows from the fact that the expert provides sufficient quality in both equilibria and for AP from the observation that the expert charges correctly in none of them. Promises AP and SQ have an effect in the range
In this range SQ selects the type-2 equilibrium, while AP selects the type-1 equilibrium; since type-1 equilibrium involves rejection while type-2 equilibrium entails profitable trade, the model predicts that the expert makes promise SQ and that he exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance. 28 For other values of γ promises SQ and AP have no effect and our model makes no prediction regarding which promise is actually made. 2 Proposition 2b. Suppose promises are believed and believed to be believed in game Γ P . Then the expert either makes promise SQ or promise AP and each of those promises is accepted by the consumer. The expert's behavior after acceptance of promise p ∈ {NO, AP, SQ, SQ&AP} is as shown in Fig. 3. Proof. Let α p denote the consumer's (initial) belief about the expert's behavior when he has made promise p ∈ {NO, SQ , AP, SQ&AP} and the consumer has accepted. Also let β p denote the expert's expectation of α p conditional on the consumer's acceptance after the promise p has been made. Then
while the expectation under the promise AP depends on the price-vector. It is the same as that for SQ for "overtreatment" price-vectors (defined by P h − C h > P l − C l ), it is the same as that for SQ&AP for "equal mark-up" price-vectors (defined by P h − C h = P l − C l ), and it is
for "undertreatment" price-vectors (defined by P h − C h < P l − C l ). Given those expectations it is straightforward to show that the expert's behavior in the subgame starting when the consumer has accepted after promise p has been made is as shown in Fig. 3 . 29 First notice that the promise NO yields rejection if it is believed. Thus, the expert will never use this promise if he expects that promises are believed. Next notice that the promise SQ strictly dominates the promise SQ&AP for any γ > 0. To see this, first note that both promises yield acceptance by the consumer. Furthermore, for γ > 1/q l the promise SQ&AP implies a lower price for the consumer than SQ at a material cost for the expert, but exactly the same amount of guilt; and for γ 1/q l both promises yield exactly the same behavior (and thereby also the same material payoff for the expert), but SQ&AP yields a higher amount of guilt than SQ . Thus, promise SQ&AP will never be made if it is expected to be believed.
So we are left with the promises in the set {SQ, AP}. Here, the comparison is more complicated; it depends on the kind of price-vector under which transactions (potentially) take place, on the magnitude of V and potentially also on γ . 30 2 27 For completeness we mention that there exists such an equilibrium for a single realization of γ , namely for γ = 1/q l . However, since this equilibrium exists only at a single point we ignore it in the sequel. 28 Our discussion assumes that there is some uncertainty about the expectation and behavior of the other side of the market when there is equilibrium multiplicity. 29 In the figure AP UT stands for the promise AP under an undertreatment price-vector. The behavior after the promise AP under an overtreatment vector is the same as after promise SQ , and the behavior under an equal mark-up vector is the same as after SQ&AP. 30 Under equal mark-up price-vectors SQ dominates AP for all V and all γ (because AP yields the same payoff expectations as SQ&AP for this case); under overtreatment price-vectors the two promises are equivalent to each other (because they yield the same payoff expectations for the consumer); and under A.3. Formal results for the game with money-burning option, Γ M Proposition 3. Consider the game Γ M . For any γ ∈ ((C h − C l )/(P h + x ), 1) the path predicted by (iterated) forward-induction reasoning is unique and it involves full efficiency without money burning. Proof. We start by showing that -for guilt-sensitivity parameters in the range ((C h − C l )/(P h + x), 1) -for any m ∈ M = {0, , 2 , . . . , x } only type-2 behavior is consistent with the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
To see this, first suppose the consumer burns the maximal feasible amount x . If the expert is rational and believes in the rationality of the consumer when he has to decide in the subgame starting after the amount x has been burned, then he infers that E α x (π c ) x . Therefore, E β x (π c ) x . 31 We now show that an expert with such an expectation necessarily provides C h in state h for any γ > (C h − C l )/(P h + x ). By the arguments given earlier it is sufficient to show that (h, h|h) (l, h|h) under those conditions. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose (l, h|h) (h, h|h) . Then
which is inconsistent with the restriction on γ we started with. Taking the same logic one step further, suppose now the consumer burns the amount (x − 1) . Then the expert infers from that that E α (x−1) (π c ) − (x − 1) V − P h − x . This is so because -if both the expert and the consumer accept the above reasoning -they believe that by burning the amount x the consumer can guarantee a material payoff of at least V − P h − x . Hence, burning (x − 1) is consistent with common knowledge of rationality only if this does not yield less. Thus, E α (x−1) (π c ) V − P h − x , where the last inequality is implied by our assumption on x. 32 Now, since E β (x−1) (π c ) x , we can apply the same arguments as above to show that the expert treats the consumer appropriately, even when she burns only m = (x − 1) . Furthermore, for m = (x − 2) we get -by the same argument -the inequality E(π c ) − (
x and thus again appropriate treatment. Proceeding this way further we get to the prediction that for any m ∈ M (even for m = 0!) the expert treats the consumer appropriately. Anticipating appropriate treatment for any m ∈ M, the consumer decides not to burn any money (that is, to choose m = 0). 2 from Player B. Those prices are randomly determined in each round and are known to both players. Player A can combine solutions and prices as desired, i.e. if Player A chooses e.g. Solution I, he can either charge the "Price of Solution I" or the "Price of Solution II". The solution sold by Player A to Player B can either be sufficient or not. Solution II is always sufficient and solves the problem of Player B in any case. Solution I only solves Problem I. The following table shows when a solution is sufficient and when it is not: 
Sequence of a round:
Explanations referring to the interaction price only apply in treatments I and PI, and explanations referring to promises only apply in treatments P and PI.
1. Player A and Player B get to know the "Price of Solution I" and the "Price of Solution II", which are randomly determined for this round. 2. Player B has then 2 possibilities: He either quits this round and does not continue to play. Then both players receive no points for this round and they wait until the next round starts, in which the players will be randomly rematched.
Or he accepts to interact with Player A. 3. Player A gets to know Player B's problem (either Problem I or Problem II). He now chooses a solution (either Solution I or Solution II) and charges a price for this solution (either the "Price of Solution I" or the "Price of Solution II"). The payoff of Player A is as follows: + price, charged from Player B ("Price of Solution I" or "Price of Solution II") − costs of the solution sold (0 or 30 points) = payoff for Player A in this round Player B will neither be informed about the problem he had, nor will he be informed about the solution Player A chose. He will only be told the price he has to pay to Player A and whether the solution chosen by Player A was sufficient or not. The payoff of Player B is as follows: + 100 or 0 points (100 if the solution was sufficient, 0 if not) − price charged by Player A ("Price of Solution I" or "Price of Solution II") = payoff for Player B in this round At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 200 points. With this endowment you can cover losses that might occur during some rounds. Also, losses can be covered with gains from other rounds. At the end of the experiment your initial endowment and your payoffs from each round will be summed up. This amount will be converted into cash money using the following exchange rate 80 points = 1 Euro
